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Abstract
To break the strong assumption that most of the training
data for intrusion detectors are readily available with high
quality, conventional SVM, Robust SVM and one-class SVM
are modified respectively in virtue of the idea from Online
Support Vector Machine (OSVM) in this paper, and their
performances are compared with that of the original al-
gorithms. Preliminary experiments with 1998 DARPA BSM
data set indicate that the modified SVMs can be trained on-
line and the results outperform the original ones with less
support vectors(SVs) and training time without decreasing
detection accuracy. Both of these achievements benefit an
effective online intrusion detection system significantly.
1. Introduction
As computer network is prevailing on earth and playing
increasingly vital roles in modern society, its security is be-
ing paid more and more attention because a major attack can
significantly reduce the capability of information systems,
and any exploitable weakness of networks that can be used
by hackers and criminals would cause great loss to people.
As the backup measures of intrusion preventions such as
user authentication, authorization and encryption etc., in-
trusion detection techniques become ever more concerned
and some achievements have been applied widely with nar-
rowly satisfied performance.
Traditionally, the criteria to evaluate the efficiency of an
IDS is the tradeoff between the ability to detect novel at-
tacks and the ability to minimize the false positive rate.
Over the past decades, many intrusion detection techniques
drawn from statistical analysis [14], data mining [6], sup-
port vectors machines(SVMs)[4, 10] etc. have been pro-
posed and applied to various observable subjects. Most of
these available approaches focus on improving detection ac-
curacy and restraining false alarms, and they can achieve
satisfactory results in terms of such criteria given enough
time. However, in practice, intrusion detection is a real-time
task, that is, intrusions should be detected as soon as possi-
ble or at least before the happening of the risks. In addition,
there is usually an initial training period for an intrusion de-
tector to learn the observable subject’s behavior, and most
existing methods are based on the assumption that labelled
training data are readily available with high quality. In fact,
intrusion detectors should undergo frequent retraining to in-
corporate new examples periodically into the training data
for classifying novel attacks and changed normal behav-
ior. Therefore, running time and training time should also
be considered in addition to detection accuracy and false
alarms to design an effective IDS.
This paper focuses on improving the performance of ex-
isting intrusion detection methods, i.e., conventional SVM
[1], Robust SVM [4] and One-class SVM [10] respectively
in terms of training time and running time based on the
idea extended from Online SVM [5]. In our improved ap-
proaches, observable subjects, i.e. system calls of processes,
are trained and tested one by one in a sequence rather in a
batch ,and the classification are undertaken and completed
before next object is received, which somehow is similar to
online training.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
views some related work. Section 3 introduces three differ-
ent SVMs together with their modified algorithms. In sec-
tion 4, we present the experiment and analyze the results,
and section 5 concludes the work.
2. Related Work
Generally, observable subjects, models and techniques
are three elements central to intrusion detection [6]. The
idea of building program profiles with short sequences of
system calls executed by running privileged programs for
intrusion detection was proposed by Forrest et al [3], which
is based on the assumption that sequences of system calls
in an intrusion are noticeably different from that of normal.
Warrender et al [13] ever presented that the choice of data
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stream(short sequences of system calls) is the more impor-
tant decision than the particular method of analysis, but sub-
sequent studies did not support this conclusion adequately.
Ye et al [14] investigated the frequency property and the
ordering property of computer audit data, and pointed that
intrusion detection techniques based on the ordering prop-
erty can hardly provide a feasible solution that produces
good performance with low computational overhead due to
the scalability problem of complex data models, especially
when the intrusive audit data are mixed with white noises
of normal audit data, whereas the frequency property can
provide a viable tradeoff between computational complex-
ity and intrusion detection performance.
Liao et al [7] applied K-Nearest Neighbor(KNN) classi-
fier to label program behavior as normal or intrusive, specif-
ically, each system call in the process was treated as a word
and the collection of system calls over each program execu-
tion as document, and thus the system call frequencies were
used as subjects to represent program behavior. Based on
the assumption that number of normal instances is signifi-
cantly larger than that of anomalies, and Nguyen [10] em-
ployed one-class SVM [11] to identify “outliers” amongst
positive examples(normal behaviors) and treated them as
negative examples(abnormal behaviors), but the unchanged
patterns which can not reflex concept drift limit its applica-
tion. Additionally, based on the assumption that an attack
occurs during the training process, and the undesired in-
trusive behavior could be regarded as the normal one and
thus undermine anomaly detector’s accuracy [8], Hu et al
[4] used Robust SVM [12], which can solve the over-fitting
problem effectively introduced by the noise in the training
data set, to anomaly detection over noisy audit data.
3. Methodology
In this section, we would give a brief introduction about
conventional SVM, RSVM and one-class SVM, and then
modify them using a general algorithm drawn from Online
SVM [5], prove of these modified methods are also given.
3.1. Three SVMs on Different Assumptions
Given a training sample: Dl = {xi, yi}li=1, xi is the ith
input vector, xi ∈ Rn, yi ∈ [+1,−1], l is the total number
of input vectors and n is the dimension of the input space.
Suppose the relation between x and y is y = sgn(f(x)+ε),
where sgn(x) = 1, if x ≥ 0 and sgn(x) = −1, if x < 0,
the task uncovering function f is called classification. SVC
is a maximization(minimization) algorithm used to identify
a set of linear separable hyperplanes in the feature space
whose formula like f(x) = 〈w, x〉 + b, and 2/‖w‖ can be
regarded as a canonical representation of the separating hy-
perplane. Maximization of the margin between the positive
examples and negative examples can be transferred to the
following problem [1]:{
min 12‖w‖2
s.t. yi(〈w, xi〉+ b) ≥ 1 ∀i, (1)
The general dual objective function by applying the La-





βTKβ − 〈c, β〉, (2)
where c is an l × l vector, β = {β1, ..., βl} and K =
{Kij}, Kij = yiyjK(xi, xj), while K(xi, xj) is called
kernel function, which can be selected such formulas as
K(xi, xj) = 〈xi, xj〉d or K(xi, xj) = e‖xi−xj‖/σ . The
feasible solution of Eq.(2) should satisfy the KTT[1] condi-
tions as follows:{
βi = 0 ⇔ yifi > 1,
0 < βi ≤ C ⇔ yifi ≤ 1, (3)





βiyiK(x, xi) + b
)
. (4)
In order to solve over-fitting problem of soft margin
SVM due to noisy training data, Robust SVM [12] only
minimize the margin of the weight w instead of minimiz-
ing the margin and the sum of misclassification errors. The
objective function can be written as following:

min LD = 12β




βiyi = 0, βi ≥ 0,∀i, (5)
where θ = 〈γ, β〉, γ = {γ1, ...γl}, and γi = 1 −
λD2(xi, x∗yi), λ ≥ 0 is a pre-determined regularization
parameter measuring the influence of averaged informa-
tion(distance to the class center), and D2(xi, x∗yi) repre-
sents the normalized distance between data point xi and the
center of the corresponding classes, (x∗yi , yi ∈ {+1,−1}),
in the feature space. The slack variable λD2(xi, x∗yi) can bejustified by considering it as part of the margin.
Another adapted algorithm, called one-class SVM algo-
rithm, identifies “outliers” amongst positive examples and
use them as negative examples. After mapping between in-
put data space X and high-dimensional feature space H via
a kernel, origin is treated as the only member of the sec-
ond class. Then “relaxation parameters” is used to separate
the point of the first class from the origin. To compare with
above algorithms, we can write the objective function as:

min LD = 12β
TKβ
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where v ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that controls the trade off
between maximizing the margin from the origin and con-
taining most of the data in the region generated by the hy-













βjk(xj , xi). (8)
3.2. Modified SVMs
In the original SVMs, training data are supplied and
computed in batch by solving the quadratic programming
problems Eq.(2, 5, 6), therefore, it is time consuming to
classify a large data set and can not meet the demands of
online application, especially for intrusion detection, which
needs periodically retraining because of the update of the
training data. With this objective in mind, we consider the
case that training data can not be get at one time or sup-
plied in sequence.
For supervised SVMs, e.g., conventional SVM and Ro-
bust SVM, one example can be given for each class, the hy-
perplane with a maximum margin for these two examples
can be found by solving the objective function Eq.(2, 5).
When a new example available, corresponding to the KKT
conditions, two cases need to be considered, i.e, if it can be
classified by the current optimal boundary correctly, then
the example is not a support vector, otherwise, a new hy-
perplane should be determined so that it can classify three
examples. The new hyperplane can be found by minimiz-
ing objective function with the SVs obtained from the cur-
rent hyperplane and the new example. At the kth step, the
set of SVs can be denoted as SVk, and the existed exam-









i ) + bk
)
. (9)
Once the hyperplane is updated, the KKT conditions are
checked for all k examples, and the example which violate
the KKT conditions should be feed back to algorithm as
new examples. Borrowed the idea from online SVM [5], we
rewrite a general algorithm for three SVMs described above
to improve the performance of their training phase:
Algorithm of online training for SVMs
void OnlineTraining( )
{
set W1 = {xk, yk}, for k = 1, 2, and |E2| = 0,
// or k = n, n+ 1 and |En+1| = 0
Minimize Eq.(4, 7, 8) with W1 to obtain an optimal
boundary f1.
for (int k = 3; k <= l; k ++) {
// or k = [n+ 3, ..., n+ l]
Obtain a new element Sk = {xk, yk};
if (Sk can be distinguished by fk−1) {
Add Sk to the corresponding class;
}
else {
Wk = {Sxk−1i , Syk−1i }|SVk−1|i=1 ∪ Sk;
Minimize Eq.(4, 7, 8) with Wk to obtain a new
optimal boundary fk;
}
if (|Ek| = |{xi, yi|yifk(xi) violates the KKT
conditions }ki=1| > 0){
Ek be input next step as new elements;
}
}
while (|El| > 0) {
Minimize Eq.(4, 7, 8) with Wl = SVl ∪ El to obtain
an optimal boundary fl;
}
}
Actually, the process can start at any kth step, thus some
typical intrusions can be kept meanwhile learn to detect
novel attacks. However, because of the computational over-
head, the number of SVs, n, for the existing examples
should not be too large, otherwise, this algorithm can hardly
perform better than conventional training methods. Because
of the unsupervised nature, One-class SVM takes original
point instead of intrusive point and another normal behav-
ior at its initial training stage for subsequent classification.
3.3. Convergence of Modified SVMs
By comparing with the decomposition algorithm(DA),
the convergence of the modified standard SVM has been
proved in Ref.[5]. We would proof the convergence of mod-
ified robust SVM and modified one-class SVM in this sec-
tion. Instead of solving the large quadratic programming
problem at once, DA take small quadratic programming
sub-problems as its objective, and thus the iteration solu-
tion of the sub-problem bring the solution closer to the op-
timal solution. The training set is decomposed into working
subset B and correcting subsetN . At each step, m elements
exchange between the subset B and N . With the elements
exchanged, sub-problem involving the new working set is
solved. The exchange between B and N repeat until no ex-
ample violates the KKT conditions. The convergence of the
DA for standard SVC and robust SVC have been proved in
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Application (AINA’04) 
0-7695-2051-0/04 $ 20.00 © 2004 IEEE 
Refs.[2] and [?] respectively. Similarly, the dual objective
function Eq.(6) of one-class SVM can be rewritten involv-




























Based on several propositions of DAs, the following
corollary given by Lau et al [5] shows that keeping the SV s
in the working set will not affect the optimal solution. Here
we want to proof that it also holds for both robust SVM and
one-class SVM.
Corollary Moving an element which is not an SV from B
to N leaves the cost function unchanged and the solution is
feasible in the sub-problem.
Proof. Suppose B′ = B−{m}, N ′ = N ∪{m}, {m} ∈
B − SV , where”−”denotes set substraction, m represents
an element which is not SV .
(1) For robust SVM, we have














B′KB′N ′βN ′ + β
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The optimization problem can be formulated as follows:

min LD(βB′ , βN ′ )
s.t. < yB′ , βB′ > + < yN ′ , βN ′ >= 0,
−βB′ ≤ 0.
(11)
(2) Similarly, for one class SVM, we have














B′KB′N ′βN ′ + β
T
N ′KN ′N ′βN ′ ]
The optimization problem can be formulated as follows:

min LD(βB′ , βN ′ )
s.t. 0 ≤ βB′ ≤ 1vl ,
βB′ + βN ′ = 1.
(12)
We know that the objective function LD(βB′ , βN ′ ) =
LD(βB , βN ), and we note that N
′ does not contain any
SV . Hence, βN ′ = 0, for its elements are not SVs, and
thus LD(βB ,0) = LD(βB′ ,0), where 0 is a column vec-
tor whose all elements are 0. In addition, we have βTByB =
βT
B′ yB′ = 0 and the bound constraints of robust SVM
are unaffected, and obviously, the bound constraints of one
class SVM are unaffected too. Therefore, both the sub-
problem of robust SVM and one-class SVM have the same
solution with their corresponding proposed algorithms.
4. Experiments
In order to compare our method with the former achieve-
ments, we also select the 1998 DARPA data [9] as our ex-
periment data, which consisted of seven weeks of training
data and two weeks of testing data.
4.1. Preprocessing of DARPA Data
Basic Security Module(BSM) audit data collected from a
victim Solaris machine is used as experiment data here. Ac-
cording to the idea about processing data presented by Liao,
et al. [7], system calls that generated by the execution of
processes can be regarded as words, and thus the processes
be considered as documents. A text categorization problem
was formulated here. Any attacks or anomalies during the
execution of processes should be detected and thus guar-
antee the real time intrusion detection. Two text weighting
techniques, i.e., frequency weighting and tf -idf weighting,
can be used to transform the process into a vector. Accord-
ing to the analysis of these two methods in [7], we adopted
frequency weighting as our weighting method.
There are 5 out of 35(seven-week training)simulation
days free of attacks. Four days were picked arbitrarily out
of these five days for training, and the left one for test-
ing. There are altogether 606 distinct processes drawn from
more than 2000 sessions during the selected four training
days, and 55 intrusion sessions in the other seven-week
training data. It is worth noting that an intrusive session may
contain only a small part of intrusive processes or even only
one, such as eject, format, ffb, spy and so on, e.g., spy is a
multi-day scenario in which a user breaks into a machine
with the purpose of finding important information where
the user tries to avoid detection(stealthy attack). 400 out
of 606 distinct processes and 30 intrusive processes out of
55 intrusion sessions were selected as training data. These
30 distinct intrusive processes cover almost all of the at-
tack types of the DARPA training data. In order to verify
the performance of Robust SVM and One-class SVM, 15
out of the original 30 intrusive processes were disguised
as normal processes and incorporated into the truly normal
ones. The BSM data of the third day of the seventh training
week which contains 412 sessions and 5285 normal pro-
cesses was chosen as normal part of the test data set(some
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of them are same in order to count false alarms), while ab-
normal part of testing data contains 25 out of 55 intrusive
sessions. The training data and testing data are illustrated in
Table 1.
clean data (process) noisy data (process)
normal intrusive normal intrusive
Training 400 30 415 15
Testing 5285 25 sessions 5285 25 sessions
Table 1. Experiment Data Sets
There are 35 clear or stealthy attack instances included
in 55 intrusive sessions, representing all types of attacks and
intrusion scenarios in the seven-week training data. When
a process is determined as intrusive, the session that the
process is associated is classified as an attack session, and
each attacks counts as one detection. The detection accu-
racy is then calculated as the rate of detected attacks, and
the false positive probability is defined as the rate of mis-
classified normal processes(these two terms are not rigorous
symmetry here). One potential problem of intrusion detec-
tion here is that, as the time passes, the old hyperplane got
by SVMs will no longer accurately distinguish the normali-
ties or anomalies, one solution to handle this concept drift is
periodically retrain the SVMs, therefore, training time is an-
other important factor worth consideration.
4.2. Results and Discussion
We did experiments over clean training data and noisy
training data respectively using different SVMs we pre-
sented above. All the SVMs were implemented with the
RBF kernel function(i.e. K(xi, xj) = e‖xi−xj‖/σ), and the
best hyperplane were obtained by varying the regulation
parameters. The performance of various SVMs were com-
pared in terms of detection accuracy, the number of support
vectors and training time.
Table 2 illustrated the detection accuracy of conventional
SVM, RSVM and One-class SVM over clean training data
and noisy training data respectively. The intrusion detection
systems usually require the false positive rate lower than
1% due to the fact that too much false positive would make
the systems inefficacy. The results showed that SVM, RSM,
and One-class almost have the same performance over clean
training data, but RSVM has better performance than tradi-
tional SVM over noisy data due to its ability of solving the
overfitting problem. After modification, the detection accu-
racy of all the SVCs have a little improvement, which shows
that the modified methods have better generalization perfor-





Original 80.00 83.33 83.33
Modified 83.33 80.00 86.67
Noisy Data Original 50.00 73.33 83.33
Modified 53.33 76.67 86.67
Table 2. Comparison of the Detection Accu-
racy when FP. less than 1%
not have great change over clean training data and noisy
data, because it is an unsupervised approach, which can be
trained with unlabelled training data.
Another factor worth considering is the number of sup-
port vectors. As we know, classifying new examples by
SVCs is the process of solving the quadratic programming
problem, and the computational complexity of SVCs is of
linear proportion to the number of SVs, therefore, SVMs
with less SVs require less running time, which benefits on-
line intrusion detection significantly. As illustrated in ta-
ble 3, traditional SVM and RSVM have more support vec-
tors over the clean training data than over the noisy training
data because of the misclassified elements, and the num-
ber of SVs of methods modified by OSVM is generally less
than that of the original ones. One-class SVM nearly keep
unchanging. After getting the optimal boundaries, we use
5310 testing process to test them for comparing running
time and test errors. The results showed that the reduced
SVs did not effect test errors.
Training Data Algorithms SVM RSVM One-class SVM
Clean Data
Original 46 34 37
Modified 43 32 30
Noisy Data Original 41 19 37
Modified 36 19 30
Table 3. Comparison of the Number of SVs
Besides the detection accuracy and support vectors, an-
other problem that needs to be addressed is the training time
of intrusion detectors. Available intrusion detection meth-
ods rely on too strong assumption that labelled training data
can be obtained readily with high quality, which undermines
their efficiency and limits their application. An ideal IDs
should be trained with any provided data even online, there-
fore, achieve satisfied detection accuracy during a certain
training time as short as possible is very important for an
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IDS works online. Table 4 shows the ratio of the training
time for SVMs and their modified methods with clean data
and noisy data respectively.
Training Data SVM(%) RSVM(%) One-class SVM(%)
Clean Data 56.01 51.61 59.4
Noisy Data 65.12 66.67 60.2
Table 4. Ratio of the Training Time for the
Modified SVMs/Original SVMs
The training time of the modified SVMs were much less
than that of the original ones, while RSVM and One-class
SVM need more training time than conventional SVM in
order to get high detection accuracy with false positive less
than 1%. The training time of modified SVMs we got rep-
resent an average performance over 50 trials, and it highly
depends on the distribution of the SVs in the training se-
quence we provided. Our modified algorithms deteriorated
severely in the case that anomaly points were provided af-
ter most of the normal points had been supplied due to the
suddenly change of the boundaries in their nature. Under
such cases, modified algorithms performs narrowly better
than original algorithms. In our experiment, the fastest trial
only takes 8.3s in contrast to he worst trial taking 123.3s,
so we took average performance over 50 trivial to compare
with the original algorithms.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we modified traditional SVM, RSVM
and One-class SVM respectively in virtue of the idea
from OSVM. The preliminary experiments with the 1998
DARPA BSM audit data showed that our modified algo-
rithms outperform the original SVMs in terms of the num-
ber of support vectors and training time while keeping com-
parable detection accuracy. Specifically, the running time
of the modified algorithms can be reduced greatly be-
cause the fewer support vectors, and the training time
can be saved significantly by the effective decomposi-
tion of the original algorithms for faster convergence. Both
of these two aspects are essential for the design of an sat-
isfactory online IDS. One significant discovery is that the
modified One-class SVM can be trained online with un-
labelled data sets because of its unsupervised nature,
which breaks the strong assumption that most of the ex-
isting methods are based on. It also inspires us for further
research about the application of online training with re-
lated effective unsupervised learning methods for intrusion
detection.
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